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Money and the ‘Level Playing Field’: The Epistemic Problem of 
European Financial Market Integration 
Abstract 
Financial market integration processes in the European Union (EU) are characterised by an epistemic 
problem of economic theory. This problem encompasses what ‘the market’ is, how it is to be 
‘integrated’, and the nature and role of ‘money’ as infrastructure of the fully integrated market. The 
EU’s legal framework has imported this epistemic problem along with the competitive conception of 
the market as described in economic theory – as a ‘level playing field’ for private exchange, under 
free, fair and ideally unrestrained competition. It manifests itself in European financial market 
integration processes, as exemplified in the article, via two otherwise disconnected areas of European 
Central Bank (ECB) activity: (a) the provision of central bank credit for the purpose of financial 
transaction settlement in the Eurozone; and (b) the conduct of ordinary monetary policy in the 
Eurozone. While the problem can be stabilized through legal, technical and other means, it remains 
latent, and may manifest itself again in unexpected ways, as happened in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis. Thus, contrary to ideologies that are widely understood as more or less coherent 
systems of doctrines, epistemic problems are characterised by specific tensions, contradictions and 
conceptual uncertainties.  
 
Keywords: European Union, European Central Bank (ECB), financial markets, financial crisis, 
TARGET2-Securities (T2S), neoliberalism, ideology, epistemic problems, money, economic theory 
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Introduction  
While studies of ongoing international (including European) market integration processes have 
certainly not avoided reflecting on the role played by neoliberalism, the conception of neoliberalism 
in this literature is continuously met with critique from scholars who are more oriented towards the 
history of economic ideas, and who point to often overlooked doctrinal nuances and internal 
differences. For example, Stahl (2019) argues that twentieth-century neoliberalism is often 
erroneously depicted in opposition to a strawman version of nineteenth-century laissez-faire 
liberalism as replacing naïve anti-statism with a regulatory road to competitive markets. In fact, Stahl 
argues, liberal economic thinking across the two centuries is marked by ‘a constant tension … 
between a desire to limit the state to let the market have freedom, and a continuing need to use just 
state power to bring this project to fruition’ (Stahl 2019, p. 483). By contrast, to the extent that this 
‘tension’ has been the focus of research in contemporary processes of market formation and 
integration, it has been cast as a tension between ideas or ideology, on the one hand, and practice or 
politics, on the other (Braun 2014). For example, Baker (2015) argues that ideational change is the 
product of local political, economic and institutional circumstances. However, it is worth continuing 
to adhere to Stahl’s idea of ‘tensions’ at the ideological level of neoliberalism. Others, too, have 
pointed to this, using terms such as ‘contradictions’ (Buch-Hansen 2012), ‘paradoxes’ (Cerny 2016) 
and ‘conceptual insecurities’ (Schulz-Forberg 2013). The ideas-practice conception tends to 
presuppose an opposition between a sphere of highly consistent doctrinal thought in (academic) 
economic theory and a sphere of pragmatic inconsistency and the politics of strategic interests. By 
contrast, taking the tensions, contradictions, paradoxes and conceptual insecurities of neoliberal 
economic thinking seriously suggests that ‘epistemic problems’ (Krarup 2019a) may account for 
some of the variation and doctrinal inconsistencies encountered in market formation and integration 
processes, which have otherwise been ascribed to contingencies of practice. Instead of seeing 
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‘ideational factors’ as more or less coherent theoretical doctrines competing for political influence – 
such as German ordoliberalism (Bonefeld 2012), French dirigisme (Clift 2012) or Chicago School 
imperialism (Bartalevich 2016) – we could ask how the problems characteristic of certain types of 
economic thought are deployed across academic and political spheres. Certainly, the internal plurality 
of neoliberalism has not gone unacknowledged. However, the point here is precisely to turn away 
from a perspective of consistency versus plurality in the depiction of economic thought, because it 
leads to a kind of analysis in which the deviations from doctrine are what need to be explained (for 
example, in terms of practice). For example, in Defining Neoliberalism, Mirowski (2009, p. 426) 
stresses that neoliberalism is not a ‘canonical set of fixed doctrines’, but then goes on to distinguish 
precisely 11 such doctrines, arguing that: ‘Nevertheless, the endeavor here is to provide a concise and 
necessarily incomplete characterization of the temporary configuration of doctrines that the thought 
collective had arrived at by roughly the 1980s’ (Mirowski 2009, p. 434).  
What is the alternative to the seemingly irreconcilable opposition between consistent ‘ideas’ and 
muddy social practice? Following Krarup (2019b, 2019a), my suggestion here is that a domain of 
thought may be defined instead by the central problems (as opposed to tenets) with which it is 
concerned – and, consequently, by the characteristic pattern of ‘theoretical’ tensions, contradictions, 
paradoxes and conceptual insecurities that it entails across ‘academic’ and ‘political’ spheres. In other 
words, to borrow a notion from Foucault (2002, p. 129), an epistemic problem is the characteristic 
‘principle of differentiation’ of a mode of thought that distinguishes it from other modes of thought. 
For the purposes of analysis, what is  radically different here from the ‘ideational factors’ view  is 
that it allows for the possibility of opposing theories responding to the same epistemic problem, and 
thus forming part of the same ideology precisely due to that opposition. In other words, not via shared 
tenets or principles, but shared concerns with a common problem or set of problems (Krarup 2019b). 
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Consequently, the central analytical question shifts to one of determining and delimiting the problem 
within or across different social spheres.  
In this article, I analyse the role of economic thought in contemporary processes of European 
financial market integration. The concept of ‘money’ and its role in markets and market integration 
processes has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars outside of the economics discipline, 
including those working in the field of political economy (Ingham 2016, Sgambati 2016, 
Stockhammer 2016, Beggs 2017, Barredo-Zuriarrain 2019). In contrast to these attempts to arrive at 
a correct theory of money, I follow Braun’s (2014) approach and analyse the importance of the 
nuances of economic theory in relation to policy practice (see also Lepers 2018). I begin by showing 
that what I call the competitive conception of the market, as inscribed in the legal foundations of the 
EU, is not only a key motivator behind ongoing efforts to create a ‘level playing field’ in Europe, but 
has brought with it a specific epistemic problem of economic theory. This epistemic problem 
regarding the nature and role of ‘money’ in relation to ‘the market’ and to market ‘integration’, which 
I first analyse within economic theory, is then shown to manifest itself in two contemporary financial 
market integration setups in the EU: (a) the provision of central bank credit for financial transaction 
settlement in Europe; and (b) the conduct of ordinary monetary policy in the Eurozone. Where (b) is 
politically salient and intensively studied in the political economy literature, (a) inhabits a 
considerably more anonymous realm of market infrastructures, and has only received limited interest 
in that field (for example, Braun 2018, Porter 2014, Krarup 2019c). While both (a) and (b) are realms 
of European Central Bank (ECB) activity, practitioners and political economy scholars alike tend to 
distinguish the two clearly, because the (almost) watertight bulkheads created between them mean 
that no (or only very minor) effects of them are visible, for example, from settlement credit to 
monetary policy. Nonetheless, the two are connected in the sense that they are responses to the same 
problem of the role of money in financial market integration. Indeed, the almost watertight bulkheads 
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between markets and market infrastructures warrant an account of how the same epistemic problem 
regarding the nature and role of ‘money’ can occur in both (a) and (b). From this perspective, I argue 
that the systems that separate the two realms, by legal, technical and other means, can be seen as 
responses to the problem of money, markets and infrastructures both in the European Union and, 
more fundamentally, under the competitive conception of the market. Specifically, the analysis of the 
two setups reveals that in situations where the problem has been stabilised legally, politically, 
institutionally and technically – that is, where a system of more or less effective boundaries has been 
set up between the market and its infrastructures – the distinction is seemingly natural and the market 
mechanisms appear to work on their own (as required by both the EU and economic theory). This is 
the case with settlement infrastructures following the creation of T2S, and with monetary policy prior 
to the 2008 financial crisis in Europe. By contrast, when the system of stabilisation breaks down, the 
problem manifests itself, the need for an all-permeating infrastructural force to (re-)structure the 
market becomes evident (and even urgent), and new legal, political, institutional and technical 
responses to the problem are developed. This was the case in Europe with financial settlement prior 
to the implementation of T2S, and with monetary policy following 2008. In this way, understanding 
the duality of money in relation to the more fundamental problem of market integration under the 
competitive conception of the market casts existing insights about money and finance in the political 
economy literature in a new light. Economic theory presents a difficult epistemic problem for 
practitioners of financial market integration in the EU – and not simply because they themselves 
mobilise economic ideas in contingent political and bureaucratic practice. Rather, economic theory 
is inscribed in the legal circumstances and the broader epistemic assemblage, which together produce 
a specific type of political and bureaucratic market integration situations.  
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Materials  
The analysis presented in this article is part of a larger research project on European financial market 
integration. Potential interviewees were first identified via the website1 of a specific financial market 
infrastructure integration project, TARGET2-Securities (T2S) – which listed representatives from all 
national central banks,  central securities depositories (CSDs) and other financial infrastructure 
providers, as well as some banks and banking associations – and then through snowballing. Interviews 
were conducted with central bankers, financial infrastructure providers, and selected banks and 
banking associations, along with European Commission and ECB staff. In total, 59 qualitative 
interviews were conducted with 72 individuals, mainly between summer 2014 and spring 2015. While 
early interviews primarily focused on the T2S project, they soon explored in depth related topics such 
as monetary policy, collateralisation, market liquidity and European financial market regulation. 
Indeed, the methodology was one of ‘following’ the problem of money, rather than of comparing two 
‘cases’. In this way, interviews with central bankers working on T2S could result in invitations to 
interview other central bankers working in monetary policy front and back offices, and vice versa. 
Materials also included relevant reports, legislation, consultations, hearings and speeches. These were 
found on the T2S website and on the websites of the other main institutions involved in the project, 
and by seeking out materials mentioned by interviewees. Documents were also gathered through a 
‘following’ approach, which soon went far beyond the narrow confines of the T2S project and began 
to explore questions of collateralisation and economic theory. Finally, a broad selection was made of 
classic works of economic theory, in order to cover as much theoretical variation as possible in 
debates regarding the nature and role of money. This selection, which included debates between 
neoclassical and Austrian theorists, and between mainstream and Post-Keynesian positions, relied on 
works on the history of economic and monetary thought, but also on references made by interviewees, 
as well as reports on and economic studies of the integration of settlement infrastructures in Europe.  
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Money, European Market Integration and Economic Theory 
Political economists and anthropologists alike have focused on how the European Central Bank 
(ECB)2 and other central banks rely on distinct economic theories and rhetoric in their monetary 
government (Braun 2014, Holmes 2014, Lepers 2018). Goodhart (2003) distinguished two competing 
views on money within economic theory, both of which were mobilised around the creation of the 
single currency: metallism and cartalism. Metallism sees money as a phenomenon that emerges from 
market transactions to overcome frictions, a view that underlies Mundell’s (1961) famous ‘optimum 
currency area’ theory, which served as an important economic argument for the creation of the euro 
(Maes 2002). By contrast, cartalism sees money as the creation of a powerful agent, usually a 
sovereign state that can issue debt certificates as a means of payment and make them circulate as a 
medium of exchange by imposing taxes on everyone, payable in those certificates. It is sometimes 
claimed that while many academic economists are metallists, most central bankers are cartalists. For 
example, one central bank interviewee brought a pile of macroeconomic textbooks to our meeting 
and explained how standard (‘metallist’) introductions such as Mankiw’s (2012) completely 
misrepresent how money is created in modern economies, while marginalised cartalist accounts by 
post-Keynesians such as Lavoie (2014) describe the process much more accurately. However, the 
simple opposition between cartalism and metallism does not comprehensively describe the epistemic 
problem of economic theory in the EU.  
 
The Competitive Conception of the Market in the EU 
The raison d’être of European market integration, which underlies and legitimises the T2S project, 
is to create a ‘level playing field’ for competition (cf. ECB 2015, p. 25). Market-based competition 
is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union. Hatje (2009, p. 594) explains that ‘A 
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characteristic feature of Community law is the systemic choice in favour of an open market economy 
with free competition. This choice is equipped with a series of legal guarantees.’ Thus, paving the 
way for the euro, the Treaty of Maastricht (EU 1992, p. Art. 3a) established the ‘principle of an open 
market economy with free competition’ as fundamental to the EU. The principle is restated almost 
word for word in the Statute of the ECB and of the Eurosystem of central banks (EU 2012, p. Art. 2). 
Indeed, when reporting on the European Commission motives for accepting and promoting the T2S 
project – a major financial market integration project (cf. the following section) – two interviewees 
use the term ‘level playing field’, quite independently of each other, to designate the overall goal of 
market integration efforts. While distancing herself from preconceived orthodoxy about the substance 
of market integration, one interviewee explains:  
 
That’s what [the European Commission is] trying to do: create competitive markets 
where private entities can compete with each other, but on a common basis, on a 
level playing field, if you will, and so that they can work together where it’s 
necessary and appropriate. And that’s [the Commission’s] general philosophy in 
this area. 
 
An interviewee who worked on financial market infrastructures at the European Commission in the 
early 2000s recalls: ‘We wanted to create a level playing field’. He adds that it is, of course, a 
‘caricature that bureaucrats wake up in the morning and say “what can I integrate today?”’. According 
to him, this is because, in practice, market integration involves many parties and generally requires 
support from market agents. Still, the ‘level playing field’ idea is not only constitutional in the EU 
(inscribed in the Treaty), but also clearly motivates efforts to integrate markets (see also Krarup 
2019c).  
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A ‘level playing field’ is, ideally, a situation in which there is nothing that makes selling Italian 
apples in Germany costlier than selling German apples in Germany (in the broadest possible sense of 
‘cost’, including risks, difficulties, and legal barriers and delays due to long transportation times). In 
that situation, German and Italian apple producers can compete as if they were from the same country. 
Monetary integration is important, since it removes the costs, risks and delays of currency exchange 
by forming a unified and homogenous ‘medium of exchange’. Integrated payment and settlement 
infrastructures such as T2S are essential for removing such frictions from financial transactions. I 
refer to this as the competitive conception of the market, in which market integration is understood 
as a level playing field where all (unevenly distributed) frictions have been removed. This is clearly 
adopted from mainstream economic theory, and implies a specific constellation of ‘the market’, 
‘money’ and ‘market integration’. 
 
Contested Money in Economic Theory 
In economic theory, money is generally defined by its different ‘functions’: as a medium of exchange, 
a unit of account and a store of value (Mankiw 2012, p. 82).3 Post-Keynesians contest the mainstream 
view that money emerged historically from trade as the ‘most liquid asset’ and is thus fundamentally 
‘commodity money’, that is, a medium of exchange (in Goodhart’s terminology, metallism; quotes 
from Mankiw 2012, p. 82). They argue instead that money is primarily – logically and historically – 
a unit of account. According to them, money emerged as ‘a vehicle to settle debts’ in a system that 
presupposes a sovereign that imposes not only property rights, but also taxation as a means to buttress 
the liquidity (through constant demand) of the selected credit asset, and thereby make it serve as 
money (cartalism; quotes from Lavoie 2014, pp. 187–188). The two therefore agree that money is 
defined by its ‘functions’ in ‘the market’. Their disagreement concerns which function is more 
fundamental. 
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The problem of the role and functions of money emerges in relation to ‘market integration’, even 
among theories that share a metallist orientation – for example, between neoclassical and Austrian 
economic theory (see below). The disagreement concerns two interrelated roles of money as, 
respectively, a means of payment and a medium of exchange. Tellingly of their close connection, 
Mankiw (2012, p. 82) includes the former in the latter, but there is certainly a difference between the 
single asset used as a form of payment in a transaction and the ‘medium’ of exchange proper (the 
‘liquidity’ of the asset in general).  
In neoclassical theory, from Walras (1988) to Arrow and Debreu (1954) and beyond, money is 
considered a passive and economically unimportant ‘medium’. Walras, in fact, was a proponent of 
the commodity theory of money (Cirillo 1986, p. 216). However, in his pure economics, the theory 
of a frictionless space of transactions represents a ‘perfection’ of money’s ‘liquidity’ function as a 
medium of exchange to an extent where money simply disappears. In this perfectly liquid space, 
commodities can at all times and places be instantly and seamlessly transacted for other commodities.  
If markets consist of the exchange of goods between individual proprietors, and if theoretical 
abstraction removes all of the inconveniencies (frictions) of transaction (settlement) and the 
insufficiencies of the human faculties of perception and reasoning, then no ‘medium of exchange’ is 
needed (cf. Walras 1988, p. 226). The neoclassical notion of the market famously amounts to the 
assumption of an ‘auctioneer’ who centralises all of the information about supply and demand.4 In 
such a situation, money is reduced to a numéraire (unit of account and measure of value) that can be 
chosen at will from the general equilibrium of exchange rates between commodities (see Walras 1988, 
p. 171). The auctioneer is there to diffuse price (exchange rate) information across the market, so that 
they alone cannot be a market participant, but must stand outside it as a kind of ‘infrastructure’. If the 
auctioneer were a market participant, they would be able to exploit their privileged overview and 
impede the fully integrated character of a market in which all market participants are equal. The 
12 
 
auctioneer must be – and the choice of a numéraire must be made into – a ‘bureaucratic’ space that 
lies outside the market itself (Millo et al. 2005).  
By contrast, Austrian economists such as Menger (1892), Mises (1981) and Hayek (2002), along 
with more recent processual theorists of exchange, such as Brunner and Meltzer (1971), insist that 
money is a scarce commodity that is unevenly distributed in the market, and that it emerges gradually 
from an imperfect process of exchange, that is, from within the market itself. In other words, they 
insist that money is fundamentally endogenous to markets, and that it can only be understood in terms 
of uncertainty and other frictions. In this view, money is an indispensable facilitator in transmitting 
information and in constantly adapting to new market realities without ever reaching a situation of 
perfect equilibrium (Ülgen 2005, p. 394). Mises considered Walrasian theory a ‘magical freeze’ of 
the economy, which artificially gave economic actors time to reach general equilibrium through trial 
and error – and thereby achieve a situation of full information, in which money would no longer be 
needed (Rothbard 1997, p. 309). According to Mises (1981, p. 42), money has only one function – 
precisely the one ruled out by Walras – namely as a ‘medium of exchange’. By contrast, according to 
the Austrians, there can be no numéraire, no ‘measure of value’, because ‘value’ is a universalistic 
theoretical artefact – only specific transaction prices exist. In other words, the Austrian school also 
views money as a market infrastructure, but one that is endogenous to the market itself, and therefore 
not one that guarantees the removal of frictions, liquidity constraints, unequal market positions and 
so on, because it is an integral part of fragmented and heterogeneous competition.  
Thus, these contradictory views of money are connected insofar as the neoclassicals and 
Austrians share the same conception of ‘the market’. Where these two strands of economic theory 
diverge is in their conception of how that market is integrated. In both views, market integration is 
essentially market infrastructure integration – the removal of frictions to competition. The question 
dividing them is this: Are these infrastructures to be provided exogenously or endogenously? In 
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particular, is the ‘liquidity’ function of money as a medium of exchange to emerge from competition 
itself, or is it a prerequisite for (‘fair’) competition, and therefore to be implemented outside of it? 
This is a fundamental problem for economic theory in general, one that stems from the competitive 
conception of ‘the market’.5 Now, as we have seen, this conception of ‘the market’ is shared with the 
constitutional foundation of the EU: it is the ideal of a frictionless, fully liquid and egalitarian space 
for transactions (a ‘level playing field’ in EU discourse), even if competition involves fragmentation 
between competitors. Departing from this conception, the problem immediately emerges of whether 
that ‘space’ is to emerge from within or from without. This, in turn, raises the question of whether 
the same kind of controversy emerges in European financial market integration processes. In this 
light, the following two sections analyse two realms of financial market integration practices in the 
EU that many political economy scholars and practitioners alike usually view as disconnected, but 
which are in fact connected through the shared epistemic problem of the role of money in market 
integration processes under the competitive conception of the market: (a) the provision of central 
bank credit for the settlement of financial transactions; and (b) the conduct of ordinary monetary 
policy in the Eurozone. 
 
The Problem of the Nature of Money and T2S 
Securities settlement infrastructures settle financial transactions involving securities (stocks and 
bonds) once they have been concluded in a marketplace, such as a stock exchange. Within the 
marketplace itself, an obligation to deliver securities against cash payment is concluded, but the 
legally binding transfer of securities and money takes place later, as an accounting operation. 
Between 2015 and 2017, the ECB implemented a major pan-European settlement infrastructure for 
financial markets, called TARGET2-Securities (T2S). Financial infrastructures in Europe used to be 
national, and connecting them across borders was a complex task (Quaglia 2010, Porter 2014, 
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Panourgias 2015, Krarup 2019c). The T2S platform now settles financial transactions of stocks and 
bonds homogeneously and in real time across the Eurozone.6 With T2S, the process of financial 
settlement is – according to its proponents – fully integrated across the Eurozone, meaning that there 
is no discrimination between within- and cross-border settlement in Europe. T2S is thus one more 
major step in the still-ongoing process toward fully integrated financial market infrastructures in 
Europe. Others include the single currency (1999), a pan-European payment system in central bank 
money called TARGET (1999, updated and improved as TARGET2 in 2007), the liberalisation of 
stock exchanges and the harmonisation of their regulation with the MiFID (2004) and, most recently, 
projects for integrating banking regulation and capital markets (2015–present). 
T2S was originally conceived as a solution to a seemingly bureaucratic and technical problem. 
Between 1999 and 2006, the European Commission relied on industry to integrate financial market 
infrastructures across borders. Here, the ECB was only marginally involved in a minor technical 
issue: ‘Delivery versus Payment’ (DVP). This refers to the simultaneous settlement of both sides in 
a transaction – the delivery of securities and the corresponding cash payment. Simultaneity of delivery 
and payment in financial transactions is important to central banks. As regulators concerned with 
systemic stability, they want to remove the risk of defaults sneaking in between the two. As in 
economic theory, competition and investment may involve risk, but transaction risks are simply 
‘frictions’ that should ideally be removed. Nonetheless, the apparently simple DvP principle was 
implemented in two different ways in different countries (see also Quaglia 2010, pp. 121–122). 
Figure 1 depicts the difference between the two DvP models. In most countries, including Germany, 
the private central securities depository (CSD) that holds the national securities accounts was 
‘interfaced’ with the central bank, which holds the cash accounts. As a result, both the securities and 
cash positions had to be locked while a series of messages were sent between the two systems. This 
messaging incurred a cost, which meant that these systems could not settle individual transactions in 
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real time, but instead accumulated transactions in netting cycles. By contrast, the French and a few 
other central banks had allowed a private CSD to manage special central bank cash accounts for 
settlement purposes. This enabled ‘integrated’ DvP settlement in the CSD, because both cash and 
securities accounts were part of the same system. The CSD could therefore settle transactions in real 
time, which was generally considered both safer and more efficient.  
 
Figure 1: Interfaced and integrated DvP models 
 
 
To avoid settlement gridlocks due to a temporary lack of cash in the settlement accounts, the French 
central bank allowed the private CSD to create free-of-charge intraday central bank settlement credit. 
In other words, it was to be reimbursed by the end of the day. As a result of increased competition 
among CSDs in Europe, this sparked conflict between the settlement departments of the Eurosystem 
central banks. Some of the central bankers interviewed called the debate ‘extremely difficult’ and 
‘quasi-religious’, explaining that there were both ‘philosophical’ and ‘technical’ reasons for the 
opposition to the integrated model. Some saw the integrated model as a ‘heretical’ outsourcing of 
central bank accounts, and possibly even of central bank money creation. In fact, different 
interviewees, all of whom were close to the debate, give slightly different accounts. Some say it was 
about the outsourcing of accounts, because the intraday credit is not money according to official 
definitions. Others claim that the debate was in fact about the outsourcing of de facto central bank 
money creation. This disagreement illustrates the centrality of the question about the nature of money. 
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Indeed, the uncertainty about what was actually at stake is very telling of the contradictory character 
of the problem.  
From 2004 to 2006, the conflict remained unresolved. Then, an ECB staff member (with a 
background in the French CSD) proposed that instead of outsourcing credit creation to CSDs, the 
central banks could collectively ‘insource’ securities settlement from them, in order to create a single 
settlement platform. This was the only solution acceptable to both camps, because it would enable 
integrated DvP under central bank control. According to one central banker close to the negotiations, 
it was only once the ECB staff had initiated this idea internally that the T2S project was dressed up 
in market integration rhetoric. However, it is clear that T2S was about market integration all along. 
Regardless of whether the settlement credit was money or not, the issue was related directly to the 
question of creating frictionless financial transactions for Europe. It emerged as a contentious issue 
as soon as private companies started to integrate systems across borders, therefore potentially 
exposing one another to competition. 
However, while the T2S project solved the controversy in practical and political terms, the 
problem of whether or not intraday settlement credit is money persisted, along with the more 
fundamental problem of financial market infrastructure integration. Both questions, though no longer 
politically salient, also popped up in other interviews about the T2S settlement engine. 
 
Pay with What You Buy: Autocollateralisation as money creation? 
T2S officially settles in central bank money because it is directly connected with the ECB, making it 
safer than the existing cross-border systems, which settle in private bank money, in accounts in a 
custodian bank or ICSD (ECB 2008, p. 9). One of the T2S features heavily promoted by the ECB and 
its supporters is the ‘autocollateralisation’ technique adopted from the French integrated model. 
Autocollateralisation automatically generates central bank credit when it is needed for the purpose of 
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transaction settlement. The central bank does not grant credit without high-quality security, called 
‘collateral’ – for example, government bonds or certain covered bonds. However, 
autocollateralisation is not restricted to automatically collateralising securities that are already in the 
buyer’s possession. Rather, it can also use the incoming securities of the transaction itself as collateral 
for the credit to settle (pay) that transaction. Since the T2S settlement engine integrates both cash 
accounts from the central banks and securities accounts from the CSDs, all four operations – transfer 
of securities, collateralisation, credit creation and payment – can be executed simultaneously as a 
simple accounting operation, even though it seems logical that they would be dealt with sequentially. 
Autocollateralisation is only possible because the settlement infrastructure is fully integrated, since 
any gaps between the different systems that execute these four steps would impede simultaneity and 
introduce risk, even if only an infinitesimal one. Indeed, if settlement could be done solely via 
autocollateralisation, it would resemble a perfectly liquid Walrasian space in which money is reduced 
to a numéraire. The European central bankers’ praise of autocollateralisation is therefore consistent 
with the competitive conception of the market that motivated T2S in the first place. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, autocollateralisation efficiently counters the risk of settlement failures. 
At t1 the bank is a net buyer and hence is in cash deficit – that is, it would be unable to settle 
transactions in real time were it not for the credit line provided by the central bank. At t2 the bank has 
become a net seller, and hence it is in surplus and can pay back the intraday loans provided by the 
central bank via autocollateralisation and other techniques. Normally, in t1 situations, banks would 
reserve collateral to access central bank settlement credit, but using auto-collateralisation instead 
‘frees up’ a substantial amount of cash and collateral that each bank would otherwise have to reserve 
in the system as a liquidity ‘buffer’. 
 
Figure 2: The daytime cash position of a bank for settlement 
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In addition, autocollateralisation not only prevents settlement failures for the individual bank, but also 
reduces systemic risk. One buying institution’s failure to settle will mean that a seller does not receive 
cash as expected, and so the seller may not be able to settle an upcoming purchase and so on, creating 
a chain reaction of settlement failures. Indeed, if credit is not immediately available without 
restrictions, then settlement failures can quickly spread through the system due to a drop in ‘liquidity’. 
It would also be possible to avoid chains of settlement failures by having banks reserve collateral as 
a buffer. Again, however, the instantaneous exchangeability between cash and securities in 
autocollateralisation means that banks only need very small cash and collateral buffers locked into 
the settlement system, thereby optimising ‘liquidity efficiency’. Paradoxically, the idealised 
Walrasian ‘metallism’ of frictionless transactions and the passive ‘cartalist’ adoption of credit 
provision to transaction needs meet in the seemingly perfectly integrated transaction space of T2S.  
While T2S has resolved the situated contestation of the outsourcing of autocollateralisation to 
private CSDs, it must still contend with the epistemic problem of money, even though central bankers 
have ceased to contest it. Officially, the status of the intraday settlement credit created in T2S is clear. 
It is not money because it is only intraday credit, whereas money proper is overnight credit, according 
to central bank definitions (cf. ECB 2013, p. Part 2, 1(a)). Nevertheless, T2S is also officially said to 
settle in central bank money (ECB 2008, p. 9). One central banker admits a certain confusion of terms, 
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because the intraday credit clearly performs monetary functions of settlement and payment, even 
creating a perfectly fluid ‘medium of exchange’ in the closed T2S world:  
 
Interviewee: The credit [created by autocollateralisation] facilitates the fluidity of 
operations. By contrast, it doesn’t work for end-of-day liquidity. That is, it’s not 
cash. … 
Interviewer: Intraday credit – you don’t consider that cash?  
Interviewee: No, exactly. It only becomes cash during the night, after midnight. … 
It’s almost central bank money, if you like … because by night-time, if they [the 
banks] are still debtors, it will become central bank money [the intraday credit will 
automatically be rolled over into an overnight credit by the central bank]. So, there 
is assimilation. … It’s not money, but then it is somehow after all. … It’s not central 
bank money in the pure sense of the term, but it facilitates because it’s a credit line. 
… It’s a loan, it has to be paid back at night. It’s intraday credit, really, that 
facilitates the movement of cash, makes it fluid. But it’s not cash. Because at night 
it’s no longer cash – the end of the day is the term of the loan. (Author’s italics) 
 
On the one hand, it is not money de jure, since it is only an intraday credit that must be paid back 
before 18:00, when T2S daytime settlement ends. Defining the credit as ‘not money’ corresponds to 
the official measures of the money supply (quantity of money) M, as used by economists and central 
bankers (Mankiw 2012, Bank of England 2014). That is why the ‘velocity’ of money – the average 
number of times M changes hands in transactions within a given time period – for a whole year can 
actually be lower than the velocity of intraday credit in a single day (Manning et al. 2009, p. 70). On 
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the other hand, it performs the monetary function of payment, and instantly counts as money in the 
account of the receiver. Moreover, there is ‘assimilation’ between the two, in that intraday credit 
outstanding by the end of the day in T2S is simply rolled over automatically by the central bank, 
creating an overnight credit (money) based on the collateral already pledged for the intraday credit 
(see also BIS 2003). In order to deter banks from using the mechanism systematically as a source of 
refunding, automatic rollover incurs punitive interest rates.  
Analytically, this could at first glance seem like a question of the ‘degrees’ of moneyness of 
credit instruments with different maturities, as expressed by the various official measures of the 
quantity of money, M0, M1, M2, and so on (see, for example, Bank of England 2014, pp. 22–23). 
However, it is not simply a case of ‘M-1’ (M minus one – in other words, intraday). Rather, it is a 
question of settlement credit simultaneously being and not being money. It is a contradiction and a 
problem: ‘It is not money, but then it is somehow after all.’  
Again, in practice, the delimitation is enforced not only de jure, but also by the penalty on credit 
rollover, which serves to avoid a chaotic breakdown of the walls that separate ‘the market’ from its 
‘infrastructure’. Indeed, the entire system of financial infrastructures is structured on the basis of this 
distinction. For example, overnight and intraday liquidity steering in banks are often separate 
functions and subject to different regulations. Intraday credit does not affect the balance sheets of 
banks, but overnight money does. Similarly, few if any interviewees believe that T2S and 
autocollateralisation will have any influence on interest rates and the money supply, although they 
may increase market liquidity. T2S has indeed solved the problem in practical terms – it is no longer 
manifest in any controversy. This is partly because the ECB was successful in silencing critics, but 
also because T2S is an obvious asset to most of the major financial institutions involved (Krarup 
2019c). However, the interview above shows that the problem is still latent, which suggests that it 
could manifest again in the future, as it did in the Franco-German debate over DvP models in the 
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early 2000s. In other words, it is important not to limit the political economy of European financial 
market integration to the struggle between the competing interests of various parties, but to 
understand the inbuilt epistemic problem that will continue to exist, albeit latently, even after the 
political struggles have settled. This becomes particularly evident in the following section, when we 
look at the change in monetary policy around 2008 not as a development from manifestation to 
stabilisation (as with T2S), but from stabilisation to a manifestation of the problem.  
 
The Problem of Money and Monetary Policy 
Given that the question of monetary creation via autocollateralisation had been so contentious, why 
did most interviewees reject the argument that T2S would have an impact on monetary policy? In the 
end, the answer was simple: if the penalty for rolling over intraday settlement credit is high enough, 
banks will not find it lucrative to do so systematically. Most interviewees agreed that a monetary 
policy had already been fully integrated in the Eurozone in 2006 with the implementation of the 
TARGET2-system for cash transfers. However, the study of monetary policy in the Eurozone that 
followed full implementation reveals the same epistemic problem about the nature and role of money 
in market integration in that area, too. Monetary policy in the Eurozone therefore serves as a second, 
apparently detached situation of financial market integration.  
Ordinary monetary policy can be illustrated as in Figure 3, which is adapted from a sketch drawn 
by a central bank interviewee. The interest rates set by the central bank for its permanent deposit and 
lending facilities form a ‘corridor’ within which market forces play out. The interest rate banks charge 
when lending overnight to each other (‘the market rate’) will not exceed the central bank’s lending 
facility (1, cf. t2) because this corridor is always open; nor will it drop below the deposit rate (3, cf. 
t3) whereby banks are able to deposit their funds instead of lending them to other banks. In fact, the 
market rate will usually fluctuate closely around the policy rate (2, cf. t1), because the central bank 
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will offer or buy money (in other words, lend or borrow) at this rate in the market on at least a weekly 
basis, in order to push the market rate towards this level. As the interviewee describes it, when the 
central bank narrows the corridor, market activity decreases; when it widens the corridor, market 
activity increases. However, the interviewee explains, the central bank would not want to eliminate 
market activity, because the market – not the central bank – is supposed to distribute the liquidity in 
the economy. 
 
Figure 3: Market interest rate and monetary policy instruments 
 
As such, there is a strange duality to the role of money in monetary policy. On the one hand, it is a 
commodity like any other, traded in the market at a price determined by supply and demand and used 
as one side in transactions as such. As a commodity, it is scarce – that is, it has a given quantity. 
Therefore, the question of what counts as money is only natural (there is a ‘quantity’ of money, as 
the metallists express it). On the other hand, all money is created as credit, and must be created 
continuously, freely and without limits in order for transactions to be frictionless and efficient – it 
must be infinitely available at a price set by the central bank in order to ensure market ‘liquidity’ 
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(standing facilities, policy rate interventions, but also settlement credit). In the latter case, money is 
not scarce and cannot meaningfully be counted, because it is continuously created and destroyed 
according to need (in Post-Keynesian terms, monetary quantities adapt passively to market 
fluctuations).  
Just like T2S, with its free settlement credit, the ‘corridor’ rates in ordinary monetary policy mark 
the  line imposed in practice between ‘money’ as a scarce commodity and hence an integral part of 
‘the market’, and as part of the ‘infrastructure’ external to the market. This line may deter contestation 
and impose order, but it does not remove the epistemic problem nor the differentiating principle of 
conceptual contradictions about what constitutes ‘the market’, its ‘infrastructure’, and the role and 
functions of ‘money’ in them (commodity, liquidity). Indeed, we recognise this in the debate between 
Austrian and neoclassical economic theories over the role of money in markets. As a commodity, 
money is fundamentally within the market; as a system of infinitely available credit, by contrast, 
money is rooted outside the market, as an ideally neutral market infrastructure that allows market 
exchanges to take place efficiently and on an egalitarian basis, unhindered by frictions (at least by 
frictions related to transactions). As a commodity, money is Austrian; as an infrastructure, it is 
neoclassical.  
From this perspective, the whole apparatus of monetary policy in Europe appears to have been 
put in place because money is simultaneously a scarce commodity to be exchanged in the market, and 
– conceptually, in contradiction to the first function – an all-encompassing and homogenous market 
infrastructure that must be kept in place by forces outside the market itself. However, the epistemic 
problem remains in place: while a practical solution may be put in place, in the form of legal and 
institutional structures (such as the system represented in Figure 3), it is not possible to escape the 
contradiction as a latent problem by simply ‘drawing a line’ between the two ‘functions’ of money. 
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Indeed, events related to and following the 2008 financial crisis can be seen as the breakdown of these 
practical barriers and the (re-)manifestation of the problem of money.  
 
Breakdown of Monetary Policy and (Re-)manifestation of the Epistemic Problem 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the corridor system broke down in the Eurozone – and it 
has still not recovered. Following 2008, the ECB has pursued a ‘full allotment’ policy, whereby the 
urgent dry-up of liquidity was countered by central banks lending freely to banks against considerably 
more ‘supple’ definitions of what was deemed ‘eligible’ collateral (as one central bank interviewee 
puts it). This was followed by major regulatory and ideational changes (Baker 2015, Ronkainen and 
Sorsa 2018). However, while the financial crisis has passed, the world economic system has not 
rebalanced (Schwartz 2016), nor has the EU’s governance response (Braun and Hübner 2018). 
‘Unconventional’ monetary policies continue to be the norm, more than ten years after the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers, with interest rates close to and even below zero in many Western countries. 
Moreover, part of the liquidity dry-up consisted of the downgrading of hitherto eligible collateral 
(including the sovereign debt of some European countries). This pushed the ECB to buy corporate 
bonds and other assets hitherto considered too insecure and volatile for use as collateral (Klooster and 
Fontan 2019). Indeed, one of the things that broke down with the financial crisis and the ensuing 
European debt crisis was the pre-2008 relationship between collateral and credit (money), specifically 
how it was organised in repo lending, government borrowing and collateralisation mechanisms 
(Mehrling et al. 2015, Gabor 2016, Krarup 2019a, Sissoko 2019). This situation has revealed what 
Mehrling (2013) calls the ‘inherent hierarchy of money’, in which central banks alone can provide 
the necessary ‘backstop’ for the infrastructural role of money as market liquidity. 
Tellingly, Benoît Cœuré, a member of the Executive Board of the ECB (2013), describes the 
world’s central banks’ post-2008 actions in terms of market frictions and their removal, to such an 
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extent that the central banks, visibly and undeniably, became market-makers (which, of course, they 
were all along, but in a new way after 2008). Specifically, he talks about how central banks have 
removed ‘duration risk’ (especially with US ‘quantitative easing’ programmes) and ‘liquidity risk’ 
(especially in the Eurozone) from the market by fully accommodating ‘banks’ demand for liquidity 
in an elastic manner’. Cœuré expresses the new role of the ECB and other central banks in the 
following terms: ‘central banks had to substitute for the sudden disruption of interbank market activity 
and became de facto the “money market intermediary” of last – and sometimes first – resort’ (Cœuré 
2013).  
This new role has changed the image of monetary policy. One central bank interviewee described 
the change since 2008 as a move from the corridor to a ‘floor’ system, in which the central banks’ 
balance sheets have multiplied, while banks now hold large excess reserves, which push interbank 
overnight lending rates towards the ‘floor’ – in other words, the rate paid (or charged) by central 
banks on excess reserves. While often seen as a radically new form of monetary policy, it can also be 
seen as a special case of the corridor system in Figure 3, in which only the deposit rate (3) has any 
importance (the three rates are all equal, Bernhardsen and Kloster 2010, p. 4), and has been pushed 
down to or even below zero. Thus, the corridor system has ‘collapsed’ into a floor system. At the 
same time, the price of money (the interest rate) has fallen to zero, essentially meaning that there is 
(almost) no working market mechanism in the traditional sense, which presupposes a scarce supply 
of the commodity (money). The stabilised separation of infrastructure and market realms has 
therefore broken down in monetary policy (though not in financial settlement in T2S, as we have 
seen).  
The post-2008 situation shows that the epistemic problem of money does not simply follow the 
legal distinction between markets (money) and infrastructures (T2S). Rather, the duality of money as 
both market and infrastructure is inscribed in both realms, as they both come under the competitive 
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conception of the market in European financial market integration processes. Broadly speaking, based 
on the collapse of the corridor and the full allotment policy since 2008, it might be said that the ECB 
now acts less as if money is a scarce commodity, and more as if it is an infrastructure (a perfectly 
flexible liquidity guarantee). However, it is important to emphasise that both sides continue to co-
exist, because the fundamental epistemic contradiction between the two has not gone away. Central 
banks still want to unravel ‘unconventional’ policies, and struggle to get markets going again ‘on 
their own’; and regulators want to restart securities markets in Europe via such projects as the Capital 
Markets Union (Braun and Hübner 2018). However, in order to do so, they will need to develop a 
more or less new systemic stabilisation of the fundamental problem of money – as both commodity 
and liquidity, market and infrastructure – in financial market integration processes under the 
competitive conception of the market in the EU. This is a difficult (if not impossible) task. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has sought to establish that an epistemic problem rooted in the competitive conception of 
‘the market’ is a core characteristic of the European Union, and that this problem manifests itself in 
the form of tensions, contradictions and controversies around financial market integration processes. 
While derived from economic theory, this epistemic problem deviates from ideology, understood as 
a more or less unified set of doctrines. Rather, it is a common concern that produces similar patterns 
of competing and contested responses across different domains of social practice. Specifically, the 
epistemic relations of three seemingly unrelated problem situations have been analysed: (a) the role 
of money in market integration according to academic economic theory; (b) settlement credit for 
financial transactions, before and after the implementation of the pan-European financial settlement 
system TARGET2-Securities (T2S); and (c) ordinary monetary policy in the Eurozone before and 
after the 2008 financial crisis. In all three cases, ‘money’ must fulfil a dual and indeed contradictory 
27 
 
role in ‘market integration’ – as, simultaneously, an externally given ‘infrastructure’ to the market 
and an integral part of ‘the market’ itself. First, in academic economic theory, the problem manifests 
itself as a controversy regarding the ‘functions’ of money (notably: unit of account, medium of 
exchange, means of payment) in various debates: between ‘metallist’ and ‘cartalist’, mainstream and 
Post-Keynesian, neoclassical and Austrian variants of economic theory. Second, in the case of 
settlement credit, the problem manifests itself similarly in controversies around the line drawn 
between ‘the market’, in which, on the one hand, ‘overnight’ money is a scarce commodity with a 
price; and on the other hand, the market ‘infrastructure’, where ‘intraday’ money is ideally a freely 
and infinitely available liquidity guarantee. However, while the intraday-overnight distinction 
appears to solve these controversies, it does not remove the underlying epistemic problem, which 
replicates itself, thirdly, in the world of overnight monetary policy. Before 2008, the ‘corridor’ of 
interest rates imposed the very same distinction between ‘the market’ of commodity money and the 
central bank’s liquidity guarantee. After 2008, the full allotment policy caused the corridor system to 
collapse into a ‘floor’ system. Consequently, the stabilised separation of the infrastructural role of the 
ECB as a liquidity backstop, and the market in which money was a scarce commodity at a price 
(interest rate) that fluctuated according to competitive pressures, has been overruled. The ECB now 
functions as a market-maker in a situation in which the price of money is close to zero and the supply 
of money is potentially infinite.  
All of these debates are underpinned by the same epistemic problem – namely, how to create a 
bridge between money as a scarce commodity with a price set by supply and demand in competitive 
private exchange on the one hand; and as a perfectly liquid medium that guarantees the fluid 
settlement of transactions on the other. Under the  competitive conception of the market as a 
frictionless space of private competition (constitutionally inscribed at the core of financial market 
integration processes in the EU), elaborate systems of legislation, regulation, oversight, information 
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technology systems and other components are developed in order to control and discipline the 
impossible separation between the market and its infrastructures. When the problem is stabilised, as 
is presently the case with T2S, and was the case with monetary policy before 2008, the organisation 
appears natural, and only serves to confirm the simple conceptual distinction between market and 
infrastructure. By contrast, when the walls break down and the problem manifests itself, as with 
settlement infrastructures in Europe before T2S and with monetary policy following 2008, all kinds 
of paradoxes become visible, fundamental concepts such as money break down and new responses 
are developed.  
While money’s inherent tensions and hierarchy have already been accounted for by Mehrling 
(2013, 2015) and others, its relationship to the problem of market integration under the competitive 
conception of the market has not. Consequently, the problem has often been cast in terms of an 
opposition between state and market, or even infrastructures and markets as separate legal spheres 
(rather than contradictory components of the same problem). The analysis in this article highlights 
the more general problem of separating-yet-connecting markets and their infrastructures, and 
emphasises its epistemic character in relation to the competitive conception of the market. This point 
is not incompatible with accounts that place greater emphasis on political struggles, but rather 
accounts for a conditioning problem that underlies such struggles in processes of financial market 
integration and regulation in Europe (and, very possibly, beyond). In so doing, it stresses that this 
problem cannot, strictly speaking, be solved – only stabilised. 
While the epistemic problem conforms to the general tension of liberal economic thinking 
between anti-statism and the desire to use state power to bring about market freedom (Stahl 2019), it 
is also more specific. It concerns the question of the endogeneity or exogeneity of money as an 
infrastructure of European market integration, given the constitutional commitment to the competitive 
conception of the market and the creation of a ‘level playing field’ in the EU. It would take a full-
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blown genealogy to expose the history of this conception in the EU, but the end result is evident in 
the EU documents and interviews cited in the present study. While considerable efforts have been 
made in the EU to discipline the concept of money through legislation, regulation and institutions 
(for example, central banks and T2S), even when these measures are successful in practical terms in 
each problem situation, the epistemic problem itself is not eliminated, because it is inscribed in the 
very legal and political constitution of the EU.  
 
Notes 
1 www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s, today https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/target/t2s/html/index.en.html 
2 For the purpose of simplification, I speak of the ECB, but the more precise term would be the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB). In other words, each of the national central banks in the Eurozone, along with the ECB itself. 
3 Historically, money as a standard of deferred payment was singled out as a fourth function. 
4 Walras himself does not speak of an auctioneer, only of brokers who centralise and call out the bids and offers of their 
clients in public (Walras 1988, pp. 70–71). The notion of a single auctioneer emerged in microeconomic theory in the US 
after WWII (Dockès and Potier 2005).  
5 Alternative accounts of metallism and cartalism, the relationship between them and the problems that connect (and 
separate) them have been provided, but cannot be dealt with in any depth here (Ganssmann 2011). 
6 The non-euro countries of Denmark, Hungary and Switzerland will also join T2S, while, mainly for technical reasons, 
Greece and Ireland had not fully joined T2S by 2017.  
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